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LOCKETT SYMPOSIUM 
IS THE SUPREME COURT’S COMMAND ON MITIGATING
CIRCUMSTANCES A SPOONFUL OF SUGAR WITH A
POISON PILL FOR THE DEATH PENALTY? 
Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier* 
Achieving the proper balance between clear guidelines that assure rela-
tive equality of treatment, and discretion to consider individual factors 
whose weight cannot always be preassigned, is no easy task in any sen-
tencing system. Where life itself is what hangs in the balance, a fine 
precision in the process must be insisted upon.1 
A major portion of the tale of the history of the death penalty in the 
United States features the ways that the death penalty system has shifted 
from a mandatory system to one with complete jury discretion and then 
eventually settling somewhere in between. A key part of this resolution 
came through the landmark U.S. Supreme Court case Lockett v. Ohio.2 
Lockett was important in many ways, largely because it ensured a 
fairer death penalty by protecting the constitutional right of defendants to 
introduce mitigating factors in death penalty cases. But in creating a fairer 
death penalty, it may also have undermined the death penalty itself by 
making it more like the death penalty the Supreme Court had found 
unconstitutional in 1972. 
Part One of this essay briefly discusses the history of the basic 
sentencing structure of the United States death penalty. Part Two briefly 
explains some of the historical significance of Lockett v. Ohio. Part Three 
addresses how Lockett made the death penalty fairer and indirectly saved 
the death penalty, while perhaps also planting the seeds for the demise of 
the U.S. death penalty. 
* Professor of Law, City University of New York School of Law. J.D., Case Western Reserve
University School of Law; B.A., Case Western Reserve University. 
1. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 620 (1978) (Marshall, J., concurring). 
2. Id. 
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I. THE EARLY AMERICAN DEATH PENALTY 
By the time the Bill of Rights, which included the Eighth 
Amendment ban on cruel and unusual punishments, was ratified in 1791, 
every state in the United States followed England’s common-law practice 
of using a mandatory death penalty sentencing system.3 Under such a 
system, a capital defendant generally automatically received the death 
penalty upon conviction of a capital crime.4 
Such a mandatory system, however, created problems. For example, 
when faced with a sympathetic but guilty defendant, jurors would acquit 
the defendant of the capital charges if they wished for the defendant to 
live.5 
In the early 1800s, states began trying to temper the harshness of the 
system and to address the jury nullification problem by providing jurors 
with sentencing discretion.6 Thus, once a jury found a defendant guilty of 
a capital offense, the jury had discretion of whether or not to impose a 
death sentence.7 
Tennessee, Alabama, and Louisiana became the first states to use 
discretionary sentencing systems.8 Between the Civil War and the 
beginning of the twentieth century, twenty additional U.S. jurisdictions 
adopted discretionary sentencing in capital cases.9 In 1897, Congress also 
adopted a discretionary sentencing scheme for the federal death penalty.10 
And by 1963, the federal government and every state with a death penalty 
used the discretionary system.11
3. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 289 (1976) (citing HUGO ADAM BEDAU, THE 
DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA 5-6, 27-28 (rev. ed. 1967)). 
4. In the 13th century, English common law made all criminal homicides “prima facie capital, 
but all were subject to the benefit of clergy, which after 1350 came to be available to almost any man 
who could read.” McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 197 (1971). Subsequently, common law 
limited the types of homicides that made one eligible for capital punishment, but the punishment 
remained mandatory for those types of killings. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 289. “As at common law, all 
homicides that were not involuntary, provoked, justified, or excused constituted murder and were 
automatically punished by death.” Id. 
5. Id. at 290-91. 
6. JEFFREY L. KIRCHMEIER, IMPRISONED BY THE PAST: WARREN MCCLESKEY AND THE
AMERICAN DEATH PENALTY 58 (2015) (hereinafter IMPRISONED BY THE PAST). 
7. “In order to meet the problem of jury nullification, legislatures did not try, as before, to
refine further the definition of capital homicides. Instead they adopted the method of forthrightly 
granting juries the discretion which they had been exercising in fact.” McGautha, 402 U.S. at 199 
(citations omitted).  
8. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 291. 
9. Id.
10. Id. at 294. 
11. Id. at 291-92. 
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This discretionary system created what appeared to be a fairer death 
penalty system, but there was another result that some legislators likely 
intended, at least in some jurisdictions. Giving jurors more discretion also 
allowed for improper considerations.12 Thus, jurors were permitted to 
express racial prejudices in their disparate treatment of capital defendants 
based on the race of the defendants and the race of the victims.13 
This discretionary system created other problems. When sentencers 
were given so much discretion, the results among different juries were 
inconsistent and arbitrary. And “these procedures left juries free to impose 
sentence based on whatever criteria they liked, without regard to their 
legitimacy or their relevance to the sentencing decision.”14 
Eventually, in Furman v. Georgia, the U.S. Supreme Court held that 
such discretionary systems violated the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments.15 While the Justices in the majority all wrote separate 
opinions and did not agree on a single reasoning, one theme that emerged 
from several of the opinions was a concern about the arbitrary and 
unpredictable results from such a system.16 For example, Justice Douglas 
found the discretionary capital sentencing system “pregnant with 
discrimination.”17 And Justice Stewart noted that such a system allowed 
the death penalty to be imposed “wantonly” and “freakishly.”18 
Several years later, the Court held that a mandatory death sentencing 
system also violates the Constitution.19 By contrast, at the same time, in 
Gregg v. Georgia, the Court upheld a sentencing system that tried to forge 
a middle ground between automatic death sentences and discretionary 
sentences.20 
Although the exact procedures varied by state,21 in general, this 
constitutional sentencing scheme provides sentencing jurors (or judges) 
12. “From the 1930s until the 1967 moratorium, nearly 50 percent of the offenders executed
for murder nationwide were black. In the South the figure exceeded 60 percent.” DAVID C. BALDUS, 
GEORGE G. WOODWORTH, AND CHARLES A. PULASKI, JR., EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY 
9 (1990) [hereinafter EQUAL JUSTICE]. 
13. Stuart Banner, Traces of Slavery: Race and the Death Penalty in Historical Perspective, in 
FROM LYNCH MOBS TO THE KILLING STATE 100, 111 (Charles J. Ogletree Jr. and Austin Sarat ed., 
2006). 
14. EQUAL JUSTICE, supra note 12, at 9. 
15. 408 U.S. 238, 239-40 (1972). 
16. See generally id. 
17. Id. at 257 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
18. Id. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
19. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 301 (1976). 
20. 428 U.S. 153, 207 (1976).
21. See, e.g., Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 269 (1976) (discussing Texas’s capital sentencing 
procedure that requires jurors to answer three questions). 
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with a list of guidelines, or aggravating factors, that make a defendant 
eligible for the death penalty.22 Also, a defendant’s attorney can introduce 
mitigating factors to argue for a sentence less than death. At the time of 
Gregg, it was unclear how far the constitutional command for mitigating 
factors reached, but the landmark decision of Lockett v. Ohio clarified that 
issue. 
II. THE IMPACT OF LOCKETT V. OHIO
The Court’s rejection of automatic death sentences in Woodson v. 
North Carolina and Roberts v. Louisiana created a constitutional 
command of individualized sentencing, where sentencers must be 
permitted in capital cases to determine the appropriate sentence for the 
individual, not just for the crime.23 Jurors are able to consider aspects of 
an individual defendant through the introduction of mitigating 
circumstances. 
Lockett v. Ohio clarified that constitutional individualized sentencing 
did not merely mean that a court had to allow jurors to consider some 
aspects of the defendant.24 In Lockett, Ohio’s death penalty statute was 
found unconstitutional because the statute limited the mitigating factors a 
capital jury could weigh.25 The plurality broadly concluded that a 
sentencing jury should “not be precluded from considering, as a 
mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant’s character or record and any 
of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis 
for a sentence less than death.”26 
Lockett’s command created one of the most important constitutional 
principles in capital sentencing. In short, “Lockett entitles a capital 
defendant to present any mitigating evidence [the defendant] wishes, 
whether or not it falls within the scope of a specific statutory mitigating 
22. “[T]he concerns expressed in Furman that the penalty of death not be imposed in an
arbitrary or capricious manner can be met by a carefully drafted statute that ensures that the sentencing 
authority is given adequate information and guidance.” Gregg, 428 U.S. at 195 (White, J., concurring 
in the judgment). Interestingly, prior to the decision in Furman, no state that had modified its death 
penalty law between 1959 and 1971 had decided to adopt the American Law Institute’s 1959 Model 
Penal Code recommendation to provide statutory criteria for imposing the death penalty. McGautha, 
402 U.S. at 202-03. 
23. Woodson, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 336 (1976). See 
also Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 261 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 277 (1976). 
24. 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978). 
25. Id. at 608-09. 
26. Id. at 604 (emphasis in original).
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circumstance.”27 Subsequent Supreme Court cases such as Eddings v. 
Oklahoma28 reinforced and expanded Lockett’s conclusion that courts and 
legislatures may not prevent jurors from considering mitigating factors, as 
long as the evidence meets the Court’s definition of mitigation.29 
Lockett ensured that jurors would have significant information about 
a capital defendant before sentencing the defendant. The doctrine of 
mitigating circumstances revealed a range of relevant evidence, including 
details about facts that may help explain how a defendant came to commit 
a horrible crime. A social scientist examining decades of cases about 
evidence of mitigating factors would gain insight into the causes of crime 
and our understandings of human nature. 
Without the holding of Lockett, the American death penalty would 
be harsher and more unfair. If jurors did not know the important details 
about a capital defendant, they would not be able to fully assess a 
defendant’s culpability. And many people who might have otherwise been 
sentenced to death were saved by the commands of Lockett.30 
Further, Lockett eventually laid the groundwork for some instances 
where the death penalty was categorically narrowed. In 2002, the Supreme 
Court held that defendants with an intellectual disability cannot be 
sentenced to death.31 More than a decade earlier, the Court had approved 
of such executions.32 But through years of developing law and science on 
27. Stephen P. Garvey, As the Gentle Rain from Heaven: Mercy in Capital Sentencing, 81
CORNELL L. REV. 989, 1000 (1996). See also Scott E. Sunby, The Lockett Paradox: Reconciling 
Guided Discretion and Unguided Mitigation in Capital Sentencing, 38 UCLA L. REV. 1147, 1157 
(1991) (discussing how Chief Justice Burger’s plurality opinion defined what mitigating evidence is 
relevant under the constitution). 
28. 455 U.S. 104, 112 (1982) (holding that sentence must be permitted to consider evidence of 
defendant’s troubled youth as mitigating).  
29. “In Eddings v. Oklahoma, the court took the next step and held that not only must the
sentencer be permitted to consider all potentially mitigating evidence, but that the Eighth Amendment 
prohibited the sentencer from ‘refus[ing] to consider, as a matter of law any relevant mitigating 
evidence.’” Sam Kamin and Justin Marceau, Waking the Furman Giant, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 981, 
1000 (2015) (quoting Eddings, 455 U.S. at 114-15)). See also, e.g., Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 
U.S. 1, 4 (1986) (requiring sentencer to be able to consider defendant’s adjustment to incarceration 
as a mitigating factor)). See also Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393, 395 (1987) (concluding that trial 
judge’s instruction that did not allow advisory jury to weigh non-statutory mitigating factors violated 
the constitution); Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66, 76 (1987) (holding that even in a situation where 
a life-sentenced prisoner commits murder, mitigation still must be considered). 
30. See, e.g., Louis D. Bilonis, Moral Appropriateness, Capital Punishment, and the Lockett
Doctrine, 82 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 283, 286 (1991-1992) (asserting that “[t]he Lockett doctrine 
is the primary legal tool for ensuring that each decision to employ the death penalty is well grounded 
in morality”). 
31. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002). 
32. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 340 (1989) (holding that execution of intellectually
disabled individuals does not violate the constitution). 
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intellectual disability as a mitigating circumstance, such defendants were 
eventually completely excluded from the death penalty. Similarly, long 
before the Court held that juveniles cannot be sentenced to death in 2002, 
lawyers and experts litigated the role that age plays as a mitigating 
circumstance.33 Thus, for its role in limiting the death penalty for 
individuals and for excluding classes of defendants, Lockett remains one 
of the most important Supreme Court decisions on the death penalty. 
III. LOCKETT AS A POISON PILL FOR THE AMERICAN DEATH PENALTY
Yet, even as one may sing the praises of the Supreme Court’s
decision in Lockett, one may also consider the side-effects of the Court’s 
main holding. Had the Court come to a different conclusion and allowed 
legislatures to limit mitigating factors, would we still have the death 
penalty? Assuming that states would have seized the opportunity to 
exclude some mitigating circumstances, society might have become more 
outraged about the harshness of capital punishment. In other words, if 
states had begun cutting back on allowing jurors to consider mitigating 
circumstances, we might have ended up with something nearer to the 
mandatory death penalty system that many in society had previously 
rejected. And if we were nearer to a mandatory death penalty, the Supreme 
Court in the 1980s or 1990s might have invalidated the death penalty 
again, perhaps for good. 
But the Court did decide Lockett to ensure defendants may introduce 
a broad range of mitigating circumstances. So, a more useful exercise is 
to evaluate the death penalty that Lockett did create. The decision took us 
further away from the unconstitutional mandatory death penalty system 
from the country’s early years. And that was a good result. But, on the 
other hand, it brought us nearer to the arbitrary death penalty of the 
discretionary system used in the 1900s until it was found unconstitutional 
in Furman. 
Because Lockett allowed a defendant to introduce any mitigating 
evidence,34 the American death penalty system began to look like the pre-
33. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005) (holding that it violates the constitution to
execute defendants who were under eighteen at the time of the crime). Prior to Roper, defendants 
under eighteen could be executed. See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 838 (1988) (where the 
plurality of the Court held that it violated the constitution to execute an offender who was under the 
age of sixteen at the time of the crime); Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 380 (1989) (holding that 
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments did not proscribe the execution of juvenile offenders over 
fifteen but under eighteen). 
34. The Court has allowed some limits on how a sentencer considers mitigating evidence. In
Johnson v. Texas, the Court considered whether or not special questions in Texas’s capital sentencing 
statute permitted jurors to consider the defendant’s young age as mitigating. Johnson, 509 U.S. at 
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Furman system where jurors considered a broad range of information to 
make their decision with little or no guidance. If that is the result from 
Lockett, one might surmise that the decision was a poison pill for the death 
penalty. Whether or not any of the Justices foresaw the effects, the 
arbitrariness built into a system that allows unlimited mitigation could 
make the death penalty violate the constitution under the commands of 
Furman. 
Several commentators have embraced this theory that the modern 
death penalty is unconstitutionally arbitrary. For example, one writer has 
argued that “[w]here a jury can consider any mitigating factors, and assign 
them any weight it chooses, jury discretion is not guided or channeled,” 
resulting in a jury exercising “unguided discretion.”35 
Justice Antonin Scalia eventually rejected the commands of Lockett 
for this same reason. In a 1990 concurring opinion, he concluded that 
Lockett’s mitigation requirement “quite obviously destroys whatever 
rationality and predictability the [requirement of clear and objective 
standards to provide detailed guidance] was designed to achieve.”36 
Similarly, Justice Harry Blackmun found Lockett’s command of 
individualized sentencing inconsistent with the Constitution’s other 
requirement from Furman of eliminating arbitrariness and discrimination 
in the capital punishment system.37 Thus, he concluded that the 
inconsistency made the death penalty unconstitutional.38 
But other commentators have argued that the post-Lockett death 
penalty differs from the pre-Furman discretionary death penalty in 
354. The Court, however, held that Lockett only requires that a jury be permitted to weigh mitigating 
evidence and that the jury does not have to “be able to give effect to mitigating evidence in every 
conceivable manner in which the evidence might be relevant.” Id. at 372. Thus, the Court upheld the 
death sentence because the jury might consider the mitigating factor of youth for how it affected the 
question about defendant’s future dangerousness. Id. at 371-72. 
35. Chaka M. Patterson, Race and the Death Penalty: The Tension Between Individualized 
Justice and Racially Neutral Standards, 2 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 45, 68 (1995). “Thus, the Lockett 
Court moved from favoring weak discretion back to favoring strong discretion.” Id. See also Jeffrey 
L. Kirchmeier, Aggravating and Mitigating Factors: The Paradox of Today’s Arbitrary and 
Mandatory Capital Punishment Scheme, 6 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 345, 361-62 (1998) (noting 
how allowing a broad range of mitigating factors creates an unlimited number of variables in the 
sentencing process). 
36. Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 664-65 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring). Cf. Scott E.
Sunby, The Lockett Paradox: Reconciling Guided Discretion and Unguided Mitigation in Capital 
Sentencing, 38 UCLA L. Rev. 1147, 1207 (1991) (stating that Justice Scalia’s “viewpoint stands in 
contrast to that of the Lockett plurality, which crafted its inclusive definition of mitigating evidence 
precisely because it believed that more reliable death penalty decisions would result”) (alteration in 
original). 
37. Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1143-44 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of 
petition for writ of certiorari).  
38. See id. 
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constitutionally significant ways. They stress that the modern death 
penalty still provides guidance in the form of aggravating factors, i.e., 
jurors cannot impose the death penalty unless they find a statutory 
aggravating factor. While the introduction of unharnessed mitigating 
factors may then introduce some arbitrariness, it is only arbitrariness with 
respect to the decision not to impose the death penalty.39 And that 
arbitrariness only occurs after the group of death-eligible defendants has 
been narrowed by an initial finding of one or more aggravating factors.40 
Thus, the Court has explained that aggravating factors serve to rationally 
narrow the category of offenders eligible for the death penalty, while 
mitigating circumstances allow an individualized assessment of the 
punishment for the death-eligible defendant.41 
In other words, the Constitution allows arbitrary decisions not to 
impose a death sentence, but does not permit such arbitrariness in the 
decision to sentence someone to death. Any inconsistency allowed by 
Lockett occurs among those cases with at least one aggravating factor. 
That, arguably, is not as constitutionally significant as jurors using 
unbridled discretion for every convicted murderer.  As one commentator 
has reasoned, “While inconsistency is not ideal, the consistency objection 
states a lesser evil than the type of pre-Furman arbitrariness that risked 
significant over-inclusion of offenders who committed insufficiently 
culpable offenses”42 
39. “Lockett and Furman can be reconciled in that Lockett returned discretion to the jury only 
with regard to mitigating circumstances. Thus, after Lockett, constitutionally valid death penalty 
statutes must carefully guide the jury’s consideration of aggravating circumstances, yet allow the jury 
broad discretion to consider mitigating factors.” Miranda B. Strassman, Note, Mills v. Maryland: The 
Supreme Court Guarantees the Consideration of Mitigating Circumstances, 38 CATH. U.L. REV. 907, 
920 (1989). 
40. See, e.g., Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 870-72 (1983) (discussing the narrowing function 
of aggravating circumstances). “To pass constitutional muster, a capital sentencing scheme must 
‘genuinely narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty and must reasonably justify the 
imposition of a more severe sentence on the defendant compared to others found guilty of murder.’” 
Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 244 (1988) (quoting Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. at 877). For 
more on the Eighth Amendment narrowing requirement, see Sam Kamin and Justin Marceau, Waking 
the Furman Giant, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 981, 986-98 (2015). 
41. See, e.g., Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 317 (1989); Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639,
664-65 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring). As Chief Justice Burger noted in Lockett, under the view of 
the three Justices at the heart of Gregg, “Furman did not require that all sentencing discretion be 
eliminated, but only that it be ‘directed and limited’ so that the death penalty would be imposed in a 
more consistent and rational manner and so that there would be a ‘meaningful basis for distinguishing 
the . . . cases in which it is imposed from . . . the many cases in which it is not.’” Lockett, 438 U.S. at 
601 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 188, 189 (1976)) (emphasis added). 
42. Robert Smith, Forgetting Furman, 100 IOWA L. REV. 1149, 1161 (2015): “Arbitrariness is 
now mostly about consistency and not desert.” 
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Yet, while there is some difference between arbitrarily imposing the 
death penalty and arbitrarily granting leniency, one may still argue there 
is little practical difference. States often employ broad death penalty 
statutes with many aggravating factors, meaning that little narrowing 
actually occurs before jurors are given the discretion to weigh mitigating 
factors.43 
Of course, the Supreme Court has yet to find that today’s death 
penalty is unconstitutionally arbitrary. But one may still ponder whether 
at some point the Court will conclude otherwise. In that situation, Lockett 
will have been a poison pill all along, waiting to invalidate the death 
penalty. It is unlikely that the Supreme Court Justices deciding in Lockett 
intended it that way, but the logic of the decision may inevitably still lead 
to the collapse of the death penalty. Although a majority of the Justices 
have yet to see Lockett this way, Justices Blackmun and Scalia both saw 
Lockett and its progeny as undermining the constitutionality of the death 
penalty. 
One of the strongest arguments for the unconstitutionality of the 
Lockett death penalty was made in McCleskey v. Kemp.44 In that decision, 
the African-American Warren McCleskey presented a sophisticated 
statistical study to argue that racial bias in the system invalidated his death 
sentence.45 One of the sources where racial bias is allowed to enter the 
system is through jurors’ discretion (as well as by the discretion of others 
like prosecutors). By a 5-4 decision, however, the Supreme Court rejected 
McCleskey’s constitutional claims. Yet, studies continue to reveal racial 
bias in the system.46 The McCleskey Court’s evaluation of the evidence of 
disparities permitted by Lockett was the most recent instance where the 
Court came close to finding the death penalty unconstitutional.47 Because 
of this country’s history of racial violence and because that racial bias 
appears throughout the criminal justice system, standards providing juries 
more discretion also allow for more discrimination. 
These arbitrariness problems are built into the Lockett capital 
punishment system. There are at least three significant ways that 
43. Kirchmeier, Aggravating and Mitigating Factors, supra note 35, at 397- 431. Lockett is 
not the only reason that arbitrariness seeps into the death penalty system after one or more statutory 
aggravating factors are found. Many states also permit nonstatutory aggravating factors at that stage 
as well as victim impact evidence. Id. at 375-86. 
44. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 313 (1987). 
45. Id. at 286-88.
46. KIRCHMEIER, IMPRISONED BY THE PAST, supra note 6, at 310-15. 
47. Id. at 160-62. 
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arbitrariness still leaks into the system related to Lockett.48 First, 
prosecutors generally maintain wide discretion in the decision of whether 
or not to seek the death penalty. The choice may depend on the individual 
prosecutor. This arbitrariness may have less to do with Lockett’s rule on 
mitigating circumstances than other sources of arbitrariness. But at least 
in some cases, a prosecutor’s choice may depend on that prosecutor’s 
assessment of the mitigating circumstances allowed by Lockett. 
A second way that arbitrariness enters the system is through defense 
attorneys. The quality of defense may affect the outcome of the case. Even 
if counsel’s performance is not so bad as to constitute constitutional 
ineffective assistance of counsel, an attorney’s decisions, investigation, 
and understanding of mitigating circumstances such as mental health 
issues affects the outcome of cases.49 
A third way that the Supreme Court’s command on mitigating 
circumstances may add arbitrariness to death penalty sentences is the way 
that jurors weigh the mitigating evidence presented by defense lawyers. 
Each juror brings their own beliefs to the jury room, therefore how much 
weight a mitigating factor receives may vary drastically from juror to 
juror.50 
A study by the Capital Juror Project discovered that different jurors 
generally give different weight to different mitigating factors.51 And a 
significant portion of jurors fail to give any mitigating weight to some 
mitigating factors. For example, only about a fifth of the jurors surveyed 
said they would give significant weight to the mitigating factors of lack 
48. Besides the three listed sources or arbitrariness, other sources include vague and overbroad 
aggravating factors. Additionally, this article discusses arbitrariness within a jurisdiction’s death 
penalty. There is a broader arbitrariness when one considers how the death penalty is applied or not 
applied across the country or even within one state with the use of the death penalty varying widely 
from county-to-county. 
49. See, e.g., Russell Stetler and W. Bradley Wendel, The ABA Guidelines and the Norms of
Capital Defense Representation, 41 HOFSTRA L. REV. 635, 643-45 (2013). On a related note, a 
defense attorney’s ability to communicate with a client may also affect how that client–and the client’s 
family–cooperate with an investigation into the defendant’s mental health issues. See, e.g., Sarah Hur, 
Note, An Attorney’s Dilemma: Representing a Mentally Incompetent Client Who Does Not Wish to 
Raise Mental Illness Issues in Court, 27 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 555, 557-58 (2014); Bradley A. 
MacLean, Effective Capital Defense Representation and the Difficult Client, 76 TENN. L. REV. 661, 
662-63 (2009). 
50. “Individual jurors bring to their deliberations ‘qualities of human nature and varieties of 
human experience, the range of which is unknown and perhaps unknowable.’” McCleskey v. Kemp, 
481 U.S. 279, 311 (1987) (quoting Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 503 (1972)). 
51. See Stephen P. Garvey, Aggravation and Mitigation in Capital Cases: What Do Jurors 
Think?, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1538, 1538-39 (1998). 
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of a criminal record, a co-defendant who received a life sentence, or that 
the crime was committed under the influence of alcohol or drugs.52 
The study found that, as a whole, jurors give the most mitigating 
weight to the circumstances of residual doubt, youthfulness, and 
intellectual disability.53 Even then, a significant number of jurors still do 
not give much weight to those factors.54 
Additionally, only a third of jurors would give some weight to the 
mitigating factor that the defendant had been seriously abused as a child.55 
The study concluded, “[N]otions of collective or societal responsibility 
for shaping the defendant’s character played some role in jurors’ capital 
sentencing decision, especially if it appeared that the defendant tried to 
get help for his problems but society somehow failed him.”56 Yet, a juror’s 
own beliefs about individual responsibility “played a larger role.”57 
The Court’s decision in Lockett recognized that sentencers should be 
given more information before condemning a fellow human being to 
death. But in mandating that jurors be given the opportunity to understand 
the failings of human nature, the Court’s decision also allowed the failings 
of human nature to affect the sentencing process. 
The Lockett Court likely did not anticipate the disparities that would 
result from the constitutional command about mitigating circumstances. 
Having rejected mandatory and discretionary death penalty systems, 
though, the Court had little choice but to try a middle way. Lockett became 
the Court’s grand attempt to guide states to craft a fair and constitutional 
death penalty. Yet, the experiment that resulted from the command of 
Lockett ultimately failed. 
IV. CONCLUSION
Although the post-Gregg death penalty has survived for decades, 
evidence continues to accumulate about unfair disparities in the capital 
punishment system. While the Supreme Court has yet to find that the 
arbitrariness rises to the same unconstitutional level that existed at the 
time of Furman, the Court may one day reassess the modern death 
penalty. 
52. Id. at 1562-65. 
53. Id. at 1563-64.
54. Id. Even for the mitigating factor of residual doubt about guilt, which was the most
powerful mitigating factor, a significant number of jurors did not give it much weight. More than a 
third of jurors revealed that such doubts made no difference in sentencing. Id.  
55. Id. at 1562-63, 1565. 
56. Id. at 1565.
57. Id. 
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Lockett v. Ohio remains a landmark decision that ensured jurors can 
evaluate defendants as individuals rather than as categories. The case 
saved countless lives and led to a fairer jurisprudence that also created 
research providing new understandings about the causes of crime. It 
injected more compassion and mercy into our capital punishment system. 
But at the same time, the decision allowing jurors to balance the 
imperfections of human beings carved a hole revealing the imperfections 
of the death penalty itself. More juror discretion led to more fairness, but 
it also created cracks in the capital sentencing system by allowing more 
humanity and discretion. After all, “To err is human.”58 
Over time, Lockett’s impact revealed that it is impossible to have a 
fair, equal, and humane death penalty. Lockett planted the seeds of 
unconstitutionality within the modern death penalty when the Supreme 
Court had no other constitutional option for saving the death penalty when 
faced with the possible return to the days of harsh mandatory death 
sentences. Today, those Lockett seeds continue to grow and support the 
developing case for eliminating the death penalty in the United States. 
58. Alexander Pope, An Essay on Criticism, Part II, line 525 (1711), in THE POEMS OF
ALEXANDER POPE 160 (ed. John Butt) (1963) (“To err is Human; to Forgive, Divine”). 
